Dr Dejan Popović
Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to the UK
6 May 2013

SERBIA AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS:
EU Membership Perspective as a Tool for Overcoming the Past

When I was first asked by Sir David Madden in January 2013 to take part in the SEESOX seminar at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, my intention was to address the issue of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in the light of its potential in terms of overcoming the burdens inherited from the past and of creating a better future for the Balkans people within a wide constellation of nations that have created the European Union. In my opinion, the SEESOX represents one of the most competent fora for presenting Serbia’s position on the topic of high importance both for her and her neighbours. Let me just mention that Serbia has been an EU candidate country since March 2012.

In the meantime, some major developments in the relations between Belgrade and Priština have occurred thus making this issue even more relevant as we are approaching the final weeks of the Irish EU Presidency. In point of fact, in its conclusion of 11 December 2012, the Council agreed to review during the Irish Presidency the progress made by Serbia on the basis of a report presented by the Commission and the High Representative in spring 2013, with a view to the European Council possibly reaching a decision to open accession negotiations with Serbia. Eventually, the Commission’s recommendation of 22 April 2013 is that the negotiations for Serbia’s accession to the European Union should be opened. On 1 July 2013 Croatia will become an EU Member State and Montenegro will mark the first anniversary of the commencement of its accession talks. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,  a candidate country  since 2005, has yet to settle the “name dispute” with Greece in order to be given the date for the start of the accession negotiations. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still potential candidates, whose upgrading to the candidate status is subject to completion of a number of key measures in the areas of judicial and public administration reform, for the former, and with respect to the enhancement of the functionality of the central state, for the latter. Finally, on 22 April 2013 the Commission submitted its proposal for the Council’s decision authorising the opening of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo .

Having established a common denominator – the willingness of all Western Balkans countries (even the one which is not recognised as an independent State by five EU Member States) to accede to the European Union – I would like to point out that apart from the “standard” Copenhagen criteria, all these countries are expected to fulfil additional requirements within the Stabilisation and Association Process with the aim of overcoming the burden of conflicts that raged throughout the region in the 1990s. I take this opportunity to underline my deep conviction that reconciliation – as the ultimate outcome of the activation of the potential of regional cooperation whenever a conflict was involved, should be perceived as a benefit per se – a revelation of intrinsic human values that so often used to be hidden below the surface of a humdrum existence. Having said this, I have not lost sight of a warning expressed by the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard that "the world is not dialectical – it is sworn to extremes, not to equilibrium, sworn to radical antagonism, not to reconciliation or synthesis. This is also the principle of evil." To overcome the evil we have to resist the temptation of considering our position as just and the other’s as unjust and we must be determined to bring to justice all the perpetrators of the crimes committed against our neighbours or ourselves regardless of their ethnicity, while being aware of the words attributed to the British writer Charles Williams: "Many promising reconciliations have broken down because while both parties come prepared to forgive, neither party come prepared to be forgiven". Reconciliation among nations thus requires a certain degree of courage by decision-makers and recognition of the existence of a partner on the other side willing to accept an extended hand. This brings us back to cooperation, to Serbia’s performance in this domain and its expectations from other parties.

It is now almost 13 years since the collapse of the Milošević regime in Serbia. The governments established following free and fair elections in 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2012 have always been vocal in expressing their commitment to regional cooperation but the shadow of the disputable cooperation with the Hague Tribunal hovered over these proclamations until 2011 when the last two of the total of 45 Serb indictees were extradited to the ICTY. The previous Government led by the Democratic Party of then President of the Republic Boris Tadić should be commended for its contribution to closing the chapter on the fugitives from The Hague justice, even though it took three years after establishing full control over the security apparatus to track down Mladić and Hadžić and hand them over to the ICTY. On the other hand, it was while that Government was in power that in March 2010, Serbia’s Parliament adopted a Resolution strongly condemning the crimes committed against the Bosniak residents of Srebrenica in July 1995, along the lines of the International Court of Justice’s verdict. The Parliament also offered condolences and apologies to the families of the victims because not enough had been done to prevent the tragedy. In order to pay tribute to the victims Tadić visited Srebrenica (both in 2005 and in 2010), as well as Vukovar in Croatia in the autumn of 2010, where he laid a wreath on the graves of executed Croat prisoners of war and offered words of apology. I deliberately mentioned some of the actions of the previous Serbia’s leadership to emphasise continuity between the former and the present Government and the Presidents of the Republic. More than once, President Tomislav Nikolić condemned the Srebrenica massacre and in late April 2013 he went on to say: "I kneel and ask for forgiveness for Serbia for the crime committed in Srebrenica".

Apart from these primarily symbolic steps aimed at healing the wounds of wars that tainted the region during the last decade of the 20th century, bringing to justice the perpetrators of the war crimes represented a major construction block in the mutual confidence-building process in the Balkans. The capture of The Hague fugitives was not just Serbia’s legal obligation stipulated by the public international law, but a moral issue above all. In addition to that, Serbia's War Crimes Prosecutor has carried out inquests against 397 suspects and indicted 153 of them. As many as 64 indictees have so far been unappealably sentenced for the war crimes committed in Croatia and Bosnia and in the territory of Kosovo – almost all of them of Serbian origin. Moreover, 69 indictees are still facing trials in the War Crimes Division of the Belgrade Court and in the Appellate Court.

To paraphrase Theodor Adorno, truth consists of fragments which upset those involved and it is not possible to put them together without a sharp and long-lasting pain. It would be wrong to expect full reciprocity from other parties involved in the wars of the nineties, because there was none among the victims. The victims’ sufferings suggest innocence. And innocence, by the inexorable logic that governs all relational terms, suggests someone’s guilt, not justification for the committed crimes in the evil actions of certain members of the group the victim happened to belong.

Having said this, I cannot disregard the fact that the number of the perpetrators of the war crimes where the Serbs were victims, brought to justice in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the territory of Kosovo, as well as in The Hague Tribunal, is negligible, very close to zero. This fact is not only painful but it undermines the credibility of the international system of justice with lasting negative consequences. Few symbolic steps, like the visit of the President of Croatia Ivo Josipović to Paulin Dvor near Vukovar, where he paid respect and apologised to the victims of Serb origin, and the words of apology for the innocent Serb victims from the Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bakir Izetbegović, albeit important still require more vigorous judicial actions against the war criminals in their respective jurisdictions, including in Kosovo. Fourteen years after the last war in the Western Balkans ended, we also need to see the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Since 1999 just 10% of 200,000 internally displaced persons were allowed to return to Kosovo. Since 1995, when 220,000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia, just 126,000 returned, of which 43% remained in Croatia, while others did not feel encouraged to stay in the country they once had left under dramatic circumstances. It is my assessment that rather than calling the other side to make its contribution to reconciliation, each country in the region should firstly re-examine its own practice thus bringing a strong element of sincerity into the process.

A brief survey of Serbia’s relations with the neighbours shows that those may be qualified as excellent in the case of Macedonia and Montenegro. If there is any dispute with the former, it is not about the name, language or internal organisation of the state, as may be the case with Macedonia’s other neighbours, but about the status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which is not the state but an ecclesiastic issue. President Nikolić visited Skopje last October and Prime Minister Dačić was there in January 2013. With respect to Montenegro, in the last 12 months presidents Nikolić and Vujanović exchanged visits and economic cooperation was improved, while certain commentators remark with a dose of cynicism that the relations are “better than ever” once Serbia has elected a Serb President from Central Serbia rather than from Montenegro. Actually, in the quarter of century between 1987 and 2012 Serbia’s President or de facto top leader was of Montenegrin origin for 21 out of 25 years. On a more serious note, Serbia is strongly committed to further enhancement of its links with Montenegro supporting this country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Relations with Croatia were temporarily worsened after Boris Tadić, a personal friend of Croatia’s President Josipović, was succeeded by Tomislav Nikolić. Given his nationalistic background, Mr. Nikolić was initially accepted with certain distrust in Zagreb, but strong pro-European position of the new coalition Government in Belgrade, fully endorsed by President Nikolić, soon brought about the thawing. One may guess that the soft power of the EU played its role both in Zagreb and Belgrade to speed up this regional detente. Anyhow, Croatia’s Prime Minister Milanović visited Belgrade in January 2013, on which occasion he agreed with the Serbian Prime Minister Dačić to work towards further improvement of relations and to enhance cooperation and joint work on a number of issues, including EU integration, economy, refugees, border demarcation, missing persons, and war crimes. A number of meetings also took place at ministerial level, in particular the visit to Zagreb of the Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister in March, while agreement on cooperation on EU integration is under preparation. Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister Vučić was recently in Croatia and President Nikolić and Prime Minister Dačić are expected to attend the EU accession ceremony in Zagreb on 30 June. Now it seems likely that both parties are ready to negotiate withdrawal of the genocide law suits with the International Court of Justice.

With respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the position of Serbia remains unchanged. Serbia is fully committed to the territorial integrity of its western neighbour, while supporting any agreement reached between three constituent nations and two entities (Federation of B&H and Republic of Srpska). Serbia’s Government has consistently discouraged separatist rhetoric and endorsed EU aspirations. It is quite difficult to imagine the Western Balkans with Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia in the EU and Bosnia out of it. It is therefore in the best interest of all the parties involved to support the EU integrations of that country, while encouraging those forces among Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina who see their joint future in the EU to settle their internal disputes. Building a functional central state, while addressing legitimate concerns of less numerous ethnic groups not to be simply outvoted on  issues of strategic importance, is the task for the Bosnian elites in the years to come. Serbia is willing to endorse this process strictly avoiding any interfering into Bosnian internal affairs. Mr. Izetbegović’s resent visit to Belgrade, as well as the announced trilateral meeting in Turkey between all the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Presidents Nikolić of Serbia and Gül of Turkey, are along these lines of friendly positioning. Just to demonstrate how vibrant the relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo are, let me mention that the Serbian Prime Minister Dačić visited Bosnian capital in January 2013 and that the Chairman of the Bosnian Council of Ministers was in Belgrade in February 2013. In December 2012, the Serbian President received the Chair of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade. A Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation on EU integration was signed in December 2012 by the two Foreign Affairs Ministers. A Protocol on Cooperation in the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide was signed in January 2013 between the Serbian war crimes prosecutor and the Office of the prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Along with its bilateral dimension, the regional cooperation encompasses a number of multilateral schemes. Let me just mention that former Serbia’s Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović was elected Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council and has carried out this duty since 1 January 2013. Serbia also takes part in the Central European Initiative, Adriatic Ionian Initiative, Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative, European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, Danube Cooperation Process, International Sava River Basin Commission, Tisza River Basin Group, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, Central European Free Trade Agreement and a number of other regional initiatives. This sheds the light on how intensive and vibrant the relations in Southeast Europe are, and not just in the Western Balkans as its part.

However, the most delicate of all are the relations with Kosovo. The dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, following the Serbian elections, was raised to a high level in a political process with the facilitation of Baroness Ashton. A series of high-level meetings between the two Prime Ministers started in October 2012. The High Representative was very clear with the two sides from the start on the concept of the process: it would be a step-by-step process, from easier to more complex issues and it would not be open-ended. The objective was the gradual normalisation of the two sides' relations, without prejudice to the two parties' positions on the status, and achieving progress for both along their respective EU paths. Having said this, I would point out that the Agreement eventually reached on 19 April 2013 by no means implies Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo independence.

Ten meetings have taken place between October 2012 and the end of April 2013. A meeting also took place on 6 February between President Nikolić and Kosovo’s President Jahjaga. In the first part of the high-level dialogue until December 2012 the discussions dealt with the set of what was considered easier issues such as completion of IBM implementation, religious and cultural heritage, liaison arrangements. Some first significant results were already achieved in those first months. The most important was IBM implementation. By the end of December 2012 four Gates, including the two Gates in northern Kosovo, became operational and, since the end of February all six Gates between Serbia and Kosovo are now operational. In the context of the implementation discussions, the two sides also agreed to start customs collection and to establish a Fund for the development of northern Kosovo. Regarding free movement, the ID card travel regime is operational and works well. The agreement on customs stamps continues to be implemented by both sides. There was good progress on civil registry and implementation which should be completed by January 2014. Regarding cadastre, both sides are still in the process of taking the necessary preparatory steps, while Priština is in a delay with respect to adopting necessary implementation laws. The agreement on recognition of university diplomas is proceeding smoothly. The Commission assesses that Serbia’s cooperation with EULEX has continued to improve in a number of areas. Direct high-level contacts and regular contacts at operational level continue to facilitate cooperation, including in the fight against organised crime. Serbia is committed to full implementation of the police protocol with EULEX. Other significant results achieved by the two Prime Ministers are the agreement on setting liaison arrangements and the agreement on the improvement of protection of religious and cultural heritage sites (creation of special/multi-ethnic police unit in Kosovo).

In the second part of the high-level dialogue, since January 2013, the meetings of the two Prime Ministers focused on northern Kosovo and delivering structures which meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set-up in Kosovo, in line with the December 2012 Council conclusions. During their talks, the two sides agreed that the outcome of their discussions should be a set of principles and arrangements that would give the Kosovo Serb community a new vision of their future, by addressing their concerns and needs but in a way that preserved the functionality of the Kosovo institutions and legal framework.

The Commission’s final report states that throughout the high-level process the two sides showed commitment and engagement. The two Prime Ministers in particular established a good working relationship and demonstrated political courage and maturity in discussing issues of great sensitivity and complexity, often against difficult political atmosphere. The discussions on northern Kosovo and the Kosovo Serb community concerns were concluded on 19 April 2013 with the initialling of the "First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations". This Agreement was subsequently adopted by the Government of Serbia and confirmed in the Parliament by 70% of the total number of MPs.

The Agreement provides for the establishment of the Community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo which will function within the existing legal framework of Kosovo. The Community will have its Statute and its own bodies on the basis of the other existing Association in Kosovo and will be represented in the central government.

As for police, the Agreement affirms the principle of a single police force in Kosovo and the integration of all police in northern Kosovo with the Kosovo Police. A regional Police commander will be appointed for the four northern municipalities. He will be selected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo from a list provided by the four Serb mayors. So it was agreed that four mayors of the northern Serb majority municipalities will, following the consultations within their community, submit a list to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which will then nominate a candidate from the list.

On judiciary, the text acknowledges the principle of integration and functioning of all judicial authorities within the Kosovo legal framework. An Appellate Court in Priština shall be established to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities and a division of this Court will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica. It is my understanding that the judges would also be predominantly Serbs thus reflecting the ethnic composition of these municipalities.
 
Municipal elections, according to the Agreement, will be organised in the northern municipalities in 2013 with the OSCE facilitation. The Agreement also provides for completion of the discussions on energy and telecoms by mid-June. The two parties have agreed that neither side will block, or encourage others to block the other side's progress in their respective EU paths. As for the next steps, the two parties agreed to adopt an implementation plan by 26 April and to establish an implementation committee with the EU facilitation.

Let me reiterate that after this Agreement had been reached the Commission concluded that Serbia had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process. The Commission also maintained its assessment regarding the economic criteria, obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the Interim Agreement and Serbia's preparedness to take on membership obligations. The Commission therefore recommended that negotiations for accession to the European Union with Serbia should be opened.

The implementation of the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations” is not going to be an easy task for Serbia’s Government. The polls indicate that there is a 60% vs. 23% support for the Brussels Agreement, with less than 10% of the MPs voting against it. However, the political representatives of Northern Kosovo Serbs (actually the mayors of four municipalities with Serb majority) are strongly opposing the arrangements: they initially insisted on a nation-wide referendum, but once the results of the polls have been published they abandoned the referendum issue demanding the Constitutional Court to quash the Agreement as unconstitutional. The Government of Serbia is determined to begin with the implementation encouraged by the overwhelming approval from Serbia’s political parties and general population. Those who are opposing the Brussels Agreement (outside Northern Kosovo) actually belong to the right-wing fringes of the political spectrum and their protests in Belgrade did not gather a significant number of participants. In Kosovo, however, some of the concerns of the Serbs are legitimate, given the negative experience of their compatriots south of the river Ibar, including massive pogroms carried out by the Albanians in June 1999 and in March 2004. It is therefore important to send the message to them that under the Brussels Agreement they will be granted not only a wide degree of self-rule but also international guarantees for their safety within the Kosovo society while financial support from Belgrade with respect to the education, health and social welfare will continue.

Since the title of my lecture contains the phrase “EU Membership Perspective as a Tool for Overcoming the Past”, I would like to underline again the role of the EU soft power. The crisis in the Euro-zone, as well as the perception that the EU did not always act as an unbiased mediator in the previous dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, constantly imposing additional conditionalities as the Euro-integration process developed, had a negative impact on the level of support that the perspective of the EU membership enjoys in Serbia. It shrunk from 65% in 2010 to 41% earlier this year, with 31% of those who are against. However, 78% of the citizens of Serbia are in favour of the reforms on the EU agenda, demanding that they should be carried out regardless of whether Serbia would become an EU member state, thus showing the support to the intrinsic European values (rule of law, zero tolerance towards corruption, health system reform, etc.). It is striking how effective was the Prime Minister Mr. Dačić’s and his Deputy Mr. Vučić’s rhetoric in defence of the Brussels Agreement when they insisted that Serbia’s only viable future is within the EU. The existing recession has actually increased the perception of the relevance of the economic and political links with the EU partners for the recovery of Serbia’s economy. The number of those willing to accept the solution which will eventually bring the Northern Kosovo Serbs into the legal system created by Kosovo institutions because it would open Serbia’s EU path, is 2.6 times higher than the number of those who would prefer the status quo. I am pretty sure that Mr. Thaçi is reaping similar dividends in Kosovo, where the oposition towards „further concessions to the Serbs“ seems to mirror the accusations for „high treason“ in Serbia. The perspective of better livelihood within the EU – not just through attracting additional funding (as a simplistic approach predicts) but through radical social and economic reforms as required by the acquis – has proved again to be an important incentive for all the countries in the Western Balkans. Belgrade and Priština still have to implement the first Brussels Agreement and then to continue the dialogue over the property issues, cultural and religious heritage and many other important issues, but the EU role will remain irreplaceable.

Let me conclude by stating that the region of the Western Balkans has changed significantly, with the EU soft power playing a major role. Having said that, I do not underestimate the relevance of the remaining conflicts. How will the Bosnian state manage to improve its functionality given the centrifugal tendencies among two out of three constituent ethnic groups? Would the border dispute on the river Danube between Croatia and Serbia or the dispute between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina over the bridge that may clog up Bosnia’s free access to the Adriatic Sea transform into a series of new obstacles for the candidate and potential candidate countries? Would Albanians avoid the temptation of creating Greater Albania, the idea suggested in some recent speeches delivered by their highest-ranking politicians? Would Serbs and Kosovo Albanians continue to play responsibly in the years to come in an effort to keep the European future open for all of them? Would a solution to the “name dispute” in Macedonia be found and this country’s EU path unblocked before serious internal problems escalate? I just mention some of the potential (or actual) conflicts in order to emphasise that reshaping of the Western Balkans is not a closed chapter. But the last armed conflict ended by the Ohrid Agreement on 13 August 2001. Therefore the EU – in spite of the enormity of its own problems – will continue to play a major role in securing the sustainability of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Such a role however requires responsible and often courageous interlocutors among the Western Balkans politicians, whose task is to change the stereotypes and recurrent animosities shared by their voters with respect to the peoples across the border. In my opinion, fortunately, the EU perspective is a common denominator for all the countries that belong to the Balkans in a wider sense, despite all ambiguities that the notion of “Balkans” may contain, so brilliantly explained by the Bulgarian historian Maria Todorova in her “Imagining the Balkans”.